II. The Model
Consider the following model of a "small" open economy inhabited by an immortal representative agent who is blessed with perfect foresight. The agent's goal is to maximize his lifetime utility, C([), as given by U = 3 P U(CHt + CFt, It), p E (0, 1), t= 1 where p is the individual's (constant) subjective discount factor, U(Q) is his momentary utility function, CHt and CFt are his period t consumption of the home country's output and the foreign country's output, respectively, and It is the quantity of labor services he supplies in period t. The momentary utility function, U(Q), is assumed to be strictly quasi-concave and twice differentiable with consumption being a normal good and labor service being an inferior one.
The representative agent has two sources of income. His primary source of income is through the owner operation of a firm. The firm produces the consumption good using labor, 1, supplied by the individual. The firm's output of this good, y, is described by the production process Yt = f(lt), where the function f() is taken to be twice differentiable and to exhibit diminishing returns to scale. Also, in each period t the individual receives a nominal transfer payment, XHt, from the domestic government (this transfer payment may be negative).
There is an international bond market in which the individual can freely participate. In this market he can issue (or buy) 1-period real bonds, b, denominated in terms of the foreign output. These bonds pay the internationally determined real rate of return, r. If, for instance, the representative agent were to issue bonds worth b units of the foreign-produced good he would have to repay the equivalent of (1 + r)b units of the foreign output next period to the buyer of these bonds.
In the model, the individual must use currency to purchase goods. For example, if in period t the individual purchases CHt units of the home-produced good, this must be bought using currency from the individual's current holdings of domestic money, MHt. Likewise, in this period his purchases of the foreign-produced good must be bought using currency from his holdings of foreign money, MFt. A time profile of the individual's life in period t will now be given so as to highlight the circulation of money in the model. The representative agent enters this period with a certain amount of domestic and foreign money to spend left over from the previous period, t -1. Now, at the beginning of period t the individual receives in domestic currency the income his firm accrued from sales during the previous period. This amounts to PHt -f (It-1), where P1rt -XI represents the domestic nominal price of the home-produced good in period t -1. At this time the agent also receives a nominal transfer payment from the government in the amount Xt.
The individual then takes his cash to the international bond cum foreign exchange market and liquidates the debts he incurred during the previous period. These debts now amount in domestic currency terms to ( 
' This proposition is demonstrated formally in Aschauer and (;reenwood (1983). It is perhaps worth emphasizing that the law is a consequence, and not an assumption, of the setup being employed here. Different types of cash-in-advance setups can alter the traditional form of the law of one price as is shown by Helpman and Razin (1981 It can be seen quite easily from (6), (7), and (9) that the domestic rate of inflation, IH, affects the agent's consumption-labor choice. If (6) and (7) are combined, it follows that for all t 5 This condition follows from the fact that in each country the cash-in-advance constraints hold as strict equalities, implying that PHCHt = MHt and PHtcIt = MH!t for all t, where cHt and MH represent the foreign demands for domestic output and currency in period t. Equilibrium in the domestic goods and money markets in each period t requires that CHt + CHt = f (It) and MHt + MHt = j=I X,,Ij for all t. Thus, =I X Hj = PHtf(4,) for all t.
6 Note that the foreign rate of inflation does not enter into the system of eqq. (6), (7), and (9), characterizing the agent's equilibrium consumption-labor choice through time. This is because domestic residents-consumers and firms-can avoid holding foreign currency over adjacent time periods.
III. The Optimal Rate of Inflation and the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime
It is useful to compare the results just obtained with those that would arise in a pure barter economy with zero transactions costs of exchange. In this costless barter environment, the agent's optimization problem would be to maximize his lifetime utility (2) subject to his intertemporal budget constraint (9). This corresponds to the agent's solving the following dynamic programming problem (11) To maximize domestic welfare in the cash-in-advance economy, the wedge that arises in each period between the agent's marginal product of labor and his marginal rate of substitution between working and consuming must be removed. This can be done by adopting a domestic monetary policy and a foreign exchange rate regime that allows the domestic nominal rate of interest to be set equal to zero, thereby equating the private and social opportunity costs of holding money. The domestic rate of inflation required for this result is 
I + iFt and d, (et+i -et)let is the rate of depreciation of the exchange rate. In other words, the rate of appreciation of the domestic exchange rate in period t will be equal to the opportunity cost of holding foreign money, iFt/(l + iFt).
Thus, unless the foreign country is adhering to the rule for the 7 It can be shown that the domestic economy's steady-state levels of consumption, labor force participation, output, and welfare are inversely related to its steady-state inflation rate. This has the implication of a positively sloped long-run Phillips curve. For further details see Aschauer and Greenwood (1983) . optimum quantity of money (i.e., unless iFt = 0 for all t), the domestic country should adopt a flexible exchange rate system and follow the rule itself. This allows the domestic country to maximize its own welfare rather than adopt a fixed exchange rate system that constrains it to accept the foreign suboptimal rate of inflation and the associated inferior level of welfare.9
IV. Conclusion
This paper has extended Helpman's (1981) model by allowing production to be endogenous and welfare levels to be dependent on labor service as well as consumption. In this situation, it was shown that there exists an optimal rate of inflation. A case for flexible exchange rates, so as to allow the domestic country to achieve this optimal inflation rate, may then be made unless the foreign country is maximizing its own welfare by choosing the optimal rate of inflation. Then the choice between adopting a system of fixed or flexible exchange rates would be a matter of indifference.
